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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores and identifies trends in officer separation within the Navy 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) officer community. It blends analyses of a survey 
conducted on active duty EOD officers with interviews of former EOD officers to better 
understand why the community struggles to meet manning requirements at the eight-to 
ten-year mark. Analysis of the data indicates that family stability, leadership, military 
bureaucracy, and limited operational time each are factors in the community’s retention 
problem. Of those, this thesis proposes that leadership focus on a factor it can influence—
operational time. In particular, it proposes that longer tours and extending operational 
time for junior officers may mitigate officer separation. 
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In Bleeding Talent: How The U.S. Military Mismanages Great Leaders and Why 
It’s Time For A Revolution, author Tim Kane asserts that regardless of the service or 
specialized skill, the Department of Defense is currently bleeding its most precious 
resource: talented and experienced officers.1 Retention of the right personnel—
experienced strong leaders—is a force multiplier for the military, and, therefore, the 
specific issue of retaining talented and experienced officers has become crucial. 
According to a 2012 survey conducted by Allman, Fussell, and Timmons, CEOs and top 
leaders in the private sector dedicate 25–33% of their time to developing and retaining 
their top people.2 If the top leadership in the private sector is dedicating this amount of 
time to their best performers to ensure the success of their respective organizations, then 
perhaps the military should too. 
In the military, it is common knowledge that the force size expands and contracts 
over time. Similar to today’s military drawdown, the U.S. military drew down its forces 
after the Cold War, and, similarly, many of the conversations taking place today with 
regard to retaining the right people took place then as well. The difference is that today’s 
policy seems conflicted. Granted, “talent management” has become a buzzword in 
military circles for retaining the right people. However, despite the need to retain the 
right people, there is a strong desire in Washington to reduce the force due to budgetary 
constraints. These contradictory goals—reduce the force, but hold on to our valuable 
personnel—are not always compatible.  
A 2006 study by Korn/Ferry International concluded that former male military 
officers are almost three times more likely to become CEOs than other American males.3  
This study points to the ability of military officers to make complex decisions, work in 
                                                 
1 Tim Kane, Bleeding Talent: How The U.S. Military Mismanages Great Leaders and Why It’s Time 
For A Revolution (New York: Palgrave MacMillan 2012). 
2 Walter Allman et al., “High Value Talent: Identifying, Developing, And Retaining Naval Special 
Warfare’s Best Leaders” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012). 
3 Tim Kane, “Why Our Best Officers Are Leaving,” The Atlantic, January/February 2011, 3. 
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teams, and motivate others as contributing factors. All of these qualities are key aspects 
of military culture. Thus, the study suggests that there is a strong need for military 
organizations to accommodate their talented and experienced officers in order to retain 
the most qualified personnel, rather than lose them to the incentives of the corporate 
sector. 
In 2013, the U.S. government faced a massive cut to military spending. In 
response, the services were forced to cut thousands of personnel, with the Army taking 
the brunt of the hit. Some of those cuts continue today.4 Yet due to its specialized skillset, 
the Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Officer Corps remained unscathed. However, the 
community is not immune to personnel management problems. It has struggled to 
maintain personnel numbers at the Lieutenant Commander (O-4) rank. In 2005, the 
community required seventy-seven Lieutenant Commanders and fifty-five Commanders 
in order to be fully functional, but only possessed seventy and fifty, respectively.5  
Moreover, the community’s official requirements do not accurately reflect all 
requirements being filled by the EOD community. The numbers do not take into account 
the billets that are filled by the community but are not necessarily a requirement—
namely, 1000 and 1015 billets.6  While these billets are not a requirement, it is imperative 
that the community fill them. These requirements exacerbate the community’s manning 
problems.   
                                                 
4 “The Truth About Military Cuts,” New York Times, July 31, 2012, accessed on September 16, 2016. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/01/opinion/the-truth-about-military-cuts.html; David Larter, “Thousands 
of Navy Jobs To Be Cut In Fiscal 2017, Sources Say,” Navy Times, February 8, 2016, accessed on 
September 16, 2016, https://www.navytimes.com/story/military/2016/02/08/thousands-sailor-jobs-cut-
fiscal-2017-sources/80013688/; Doug Salvemini, “Details of the Military Force Reduction,” Fox Business, 
October 28, 2015, accessed on September 16, 2016, 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/2015/10/28/details-military-force-reduction.html; Jacqueline Klimas, 
“Lawmakers Say They Were Blindsided by Army Cuts,” The Washington Times, July 8, 2015, accessed on 
September 16, 2016, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/8/obama-admin-cut-40k-army-
soldiers/. 
5 LCDR Clint Cornell, email message to author, April 11, 2016. 
6 According to the Manual of Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classifications Volume 1, Part 
A, a 1000 is a “billet which may be filled by any appropriately skilled and experienced unrestricted line 
officer or special duty officer.”  A 1050 billet requires a Lieutenant (or above) who is warfare qualified in 
the required warfare specialty. EOD is an example of a warfare specialty.  
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In summary, the disparity between Navy EOD requirements and actual manning 
is much greater than what is captured by traditional manning numbers. In response to the 
manning shortfalls, the community began offering a critical skills retention bonus 
(CSRB) to curtail the loss of experienced officers leaving the community. Currently, 
despite the CSRB being implemented for over a decade, the community is still lacking at 
the senior Lieutenant (O-3) and junior Lieutenant Commander (O-4) pay-grades. On the 
surface, it may appear that the community is failing to promote at an appropriate 
threshold. Unfortunately, the promotion rates indicate otherwise. The EOD community 
out performs the rest of the Unrestricted Line communities across the Navy. The average 
rate of EOD Officers’ promotion from Lieutenant to Lieutenant Commander is above 
90% for the last five years, whereas the rest of the Unrestricted Line communities’ five-
year average is just below 75%.7 This greater promotion rate indicates that navy EOD 
officers are competitive and are out performing personnel across the service. It also 
indicates the EOD’s ability to attract the best and brightest. Paradoxically, it also 
emphasizes the retention problem. If the community is attracting individuals who are 
outperforming their peers across the service and promotion opportunities are present, why 
is the community consistently struggling to meet the manning requirements at the eight-to 
ten-year mark?  
This thesis’s purpose, therefore, is to explore why EOD officers are leaving the 
community at around the eight-to ten-year mark. Drawing on survey data and interviews, 
this thesis explores active duty EOD officers’ grievances and compares them to the 
grievances expressed by former EOD officers in an effort to better understand how the 
Navy EOD Community can better retain its best officers.   
A. BACKGROUND 
In 2011, Tim Kane, a former Air Force officer, explored the Army’s retention 
problem. He concluded that the problem stems from the Army’s structure. According to 
                                                 
7 LCDR Clint Cornell, email message to author, April 11, 2016. 
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Kane, it is “deeply anti-entrepreneurial.”8 He believes that a zero-defect evaluation 
process is evidence of this.9 A zero defect mentality harshly punishes individuals who 
make a mistake, which, in turn, creates a risk averse force.10 Consequently, a zero-defect 
mentality sacrifices an innovative and entrepreneurial spirit for a flawless record because 
as long as individuals stay out of trouble and do not receive poor marks, they are likely to 
promote.   
Kane’s argument can be applied similarly to the Navy’s evaluation process. For 
example, the Navy’s Fitness Report (FITREP) has an area reserved for promotion 
recommendation (Block 42), which enables a reporting senior to remark on an 
individual’s performance in relation to promotion. Reporting seniors can choose from 
five categories: significant problems (SP), progressing, promotable (P), must promote 
(MP), or early promote (EP). Bureau of Navy Personnel Instruction 1610.0D explains the 
formal guidelines on how to properly complete this section. It also provides limits on the 
number of MPs and EPs respective to the summary group size.11 However, the 
instruction does not include are the informal practices associated with the FITREP 
process. Unfortunately, anecdotal evidence suggests that high marks in this section are 
often more dictated by an individual’s time at the command rather than his or her 
performance. For example, an individual who arrives at a command recently is likely to 
receive average marks, regardless of his or her performance, compared to an individual 
who has been at the same command longer, but has not performed as well. Additionally, 
once an individual is given the EP slot, it is unlikely he or she ever will receive a lower 
mark during his or her remaining time at this command, regardless of performance, 
because anything other than “tracking to the right” is perceived as poor performance.12 
At a promotion board, marks that go from an EP to an MP or an MP to a P will 
                                                 
8 Tim Kane, “The Leader/Talent Matrix: An Empirical Perspective On Organizational Culture” 
(working paper, Hoover Institution Economics Working Papers, Stanford University, CA, 2015). 
9 Tim Kane, “Why Our Best Officers Are Leaving,” 3. 
10 Tim Kane, “Why Our Best Officers Are Leaving,” 3. 
11 Summary group size is the number of people at a given pay-grade being evaluated during a given 
period. For example, if a command had four Ensigns, the summary group size would be four. 
12 “Track to the right” refers to positive career progression. If an individual continues receive positive 
marks on his Fitness Report, he will “track to the right.” 
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undermine the individual’s possibility of being selected for promotion. Many 
Commanding Officers (COs) do an excellent job managing this ranking issue to mitigate 
problems; however, there are always exceptions. Not only do practices such as the 
FITREP ranking system periodically limit an individual’s ability to “track to the right,” 
but they also hinder accurate performance reporting, which, in turn, prevents the Navy 
from promoting its officers by merit. Instead, individuals receive positive marks by a 
time schedule that parallels the Navy’s time-based promotions.   
As noted previously, the best evidence of this is anecdotal. For example, assume 
that Officer X and Officer Y are commissioned on the same date and complete the exact 
same number of combat tours. On their sixth year of active duty, both check in to the 
same command. However, officer X checks in two months before Officer Y. During the 
first year, at this command, Officer X maintains status quo in his department and faces 
little job-related adversity. Conversely, Officer Y inherits a department that is plagued 
with problems ranging from failed inspections to legal investigations. Despite this, 
Officer Y turns his department around, rebuilds relations, and his department passes all 
applicable inspections. When the annual evaluations come out, however, Officer X is 
ranked over Officer Y because of time at the command, and this ranking trend then 
continues for both officers for their remaining evaluation periods at the command. 
Despite the heavier workload, Officer Y’s ability to stand out among his peers is 
constrained strictly by his time at command, and not by either his performance or his 
work ethic.   
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
According to Peter Cappelli in Talent Management for the 21st Century, the main 
reason an employee leaves is because of better opportunities elsewhere.13  In the military, 
service members leave their respective positions for opportunities in the private sector, 
where they believe they will not be bounded by bureaucratic processes.14 Cappelli 
                                                 
13 Peter Cappelli, “Talent Management for the 21st Century,” Harvard Business Review, March, 2008, 
4. 
14 According to survey a conducted by Tim Kane, 82% of individuals who left the Army listed, 
“frustration with military bureaucracy” as their top reason for leaving.   
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proposes that seeking a balance between the interest of the employee (service member) 
and the employer (the respective service) is the best strategy for curtailing employee 
turnover.15   
Predating Cappelli’s proposal by sixteen years, though, a 1992 RAND report by 
Rostker, Thie, Lacy, Kawata, and Purnell assessed the Defense Officer Personnel 
Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980.16 Congress designed DOPMA in order to create a 
personnel management system that applied to all services. DOPMA would manage 
training, appointments, promotions, separations, and retirements.17  According to Rostker 
et al., DOPMA is better designed to build the officer corps than to reduce it.18  The report 
contends that several mechanisms enable personnel managers to increase their force, such 
as a variety of commissioning programs that facilitate the conversion of reserve officers 
into a regular officers, an increase in promotion opportunities, and the expansion of field 
grade officers’ numbers by increasing the available vacancies. However, when it comes 
to reducing the force, personnel managers are constrained by laws and policies on how 
they are authorized to “cut the fat.”19   
DOPMA is also Tim Kane’s critical target in terms of reform. Kane conducted a 
survey of West Point graduates in 2010 with 250 individuals from various commissioning 
years. Only seventy-eight were still on active duty. His final question in the survey was 
“What were the reasons you left the military?  Agree or disagree if they were important 
reasons for your decisions.”20  The participants could then choose from several possible 
reasons. The top four responses were: frustration with military bureaucracy, family, other 
life goals, and high potential income. 82% of the respondents agreed to some degree 
(50% Strongly Agreed, 32% Agreed) that frustration with military bureaucracy played a 
role in their departure from the service. Eighty-one percent agreed to some degree (57% 
                                                 
15 Cappelli, “Talent Management,” 4. 
16 Bernard Rostker et al., The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980: A Retrospective 
Assessment, (California: RAND Corporation) 1993. 
17 Rostker et al., The Defense Officer, 7. 
18 Rostker et al., The Defense Officer, 18. 
19 Rostker et al., Defense Officer, 18–19. 
20 Kane, Bleeding Talent, 97. 
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Strongly Agreed, 24% Agreed) that family also played a role in their departure from the 
service, whereas, 80% felt that higher income outside of the Army played a critical role 
in their departure. Kane drew on these results to conclude that the majority of the service 
members were getting out due to frustrations with the military. His findings were 
published in both The Atlantic and in his book, Bleeding Talent.21   
While Kane’s results appear conclusive, there are some weaknesses in his 
analysis. As mentioned above, of the 250 respondents only seventy-eight (31%) were still 
active duty. This imbalance between active duty and former active duty creates a bias 
toward the opinions of those who are no longer serving. Additionally, an argument could 
be made that by the possible answers that Kane offered to the final question, he led his 
participants to reach the conclusion he was seeking. It is possible that had the final 
question been open ended, the survey would not have yielded such conclusive numbers. 
Lastly, Kane fails to define what he means by military bureaucracy. His research and 
articles lead the reader to believe he is referring to the constraints imposed by DOPMA, 
but whether that is exactly what he means remains unclear. 
In 2015, the Navy stood up Task Force Innovation.22  Since its inception, Task 
Force Innovation has increased the amount of fully funded billets for follow-on education 
at the nation’s top schools. Furthermore, the Navy is now taking steps to expand its Tour 
of the Industry program, which enables successful sailors to work at America’s top 
firms.23  Many of these changes were sparked by the Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus. 
On May 13, 2015, Mabus addressed the graduating class of the United State Naval 
Academy and outlined his plan to implement a talent management process for the Navy. 
He stated how the Navy is improving its efforts to get the right person in the right 
position and referred to the Office of Talent Optimization at the Naval Academy, which 
focuses on matching midshipmen to a community within the Navy based upon the 
                                                 
21 Kane, “Why Our Best Officers Are Leaving.” 
22 Mabus, “Talent Management.” 
23 Mabus, “Talent Management.”  
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individual’s strengths and interests.24 Unfortunately, Mabus offered no empirical data to 
support his claim, which could be due to the short time period between the program’s 
inception and this research. The innovative plan proposed addresses many of the 
grievances addressed in Kane’s book. However, many of the recommended changes 
promoted in Mabus’s speech are not legally possible without Congressional approval. 
The Navy’s personnel managers, much like those in the other services, are constrained by 
law. They do not have the ability to act autonomously even if the desired end state aligns 
with the needs of the Navy.   
This constraint, although specific to the Navy, reflects the general military 
bureaucracy Kane discusses in his article, “Why Our Best Officers Are Leaving.”25 Kane 
does not specify which communities participated in his survey, and one may question, 
whether Kane’s conclusions about the cause for Army officers’ separation apply to the 
entire uniformed service?   
C. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
Data for this thesis’s analysis draws on two sources: A survey of active EOD 
officers conducted by the Navy Personnel Command (NPC) and a series of interviews 
carried out by this thesis’s author. The goal of the NPC survey, which the Navy 
Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology (NPRST) division carried out in early 
2016, was to identify major grievances within the EOD officer community so that the 
Navy could do a better job of retaining talented individuals. This thesis draws on some of 
the survey’s responses in order to help explore why officers may be leaving the EOD 
community. However, because the survey was administered only to officers still within 
the community, it also draws on interviews with individuals who have left the EOD 
community. This dual analysis allows for a comparison between active and separated 
officers, which will help identify any distinct patterns unique to the two groups.  
                                                 




25 Kane, “Why Our Best Officers Are Leaving.” 
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Unfortunately, due to the constraints set in place by the Paperwork Reduction Act, 
which limits the federal government’s capacity to interview civilians, only nine former 
EOD officers could be interviewed.26 This limitation makes it difficult to draw any 
definitive conclusions about the current situation, and it could invite skepticism from 
some quarters. Nevertheless, by combining the information gathered from the interviews 
with data from the NPC survey, tentative conclusions and recommendations can be 
reached, which, in turn, can inform future research and studies. 
The next chapter discusses and analyzes the survey responses, while Chapter III 
discusses and analyzes results from the interviews. Both chapters discuss how the data 
were collected, categorized, and coded before presenting the analysis and discussing the 
results. Chapter VI serves as the thesis’s conclusion. It offers policy recommendations 
based on the analyses in the previous two chapters. 
                                                 
26 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee of Government Reform, Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995, 104th Cong., 1st sess., https://www.congress.gov/bill/104th-congress/house-
bill/830/text  
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II. NPC SURVEY 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Navy Personnel Command organized 
the survey of active duty EOD officers, while Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and 
Technology (NPRST) division conducted it. The survey’s goal was to identify major 
grievances within the EOD officer community so that the Navy could be better positioned 
to retain talented individuals, as well as to identify a baseline from which trends can be 
identified. It sampled 443 active duty EOD officers, out of which 229 responded. This is 
a response rate of 52%, which is lower than ideal but is acceptable. The survey opened on 
January 25, 2016, and closed March 7, 2016. It consisted of thirty multiple choice 
questions and four open-ended responses. Initially, the survey focused on demographics. 
As the survey progressed, the questions focused more on the individual’s experiences 
within the community through mentorship, professional and personal goals, and overall 
satisfaction. The goal of NPRST’s survey was to identify any major grievances within the 
EOD officer community in order to better address those grievances and retain the top 
talented individuals.   
This thesis will only focus on two of the open-ended responses—Question 32 and 
Question 34. Question 32 asked, “If you could change one thing about the [EOD] 
community [sic] what would it be?,” while Question 34 only asked respondents if they 
had any additional comments. Question 34’s lack of direction allowed the respondents to 
write on whatever topic they pleased. Since many of them apparently saw this as an 
opportunity to identify possible needed changes within the EOD community, their 
responses often addressed many of the same issues identified in Question 32. Thus, many 
of these responses were incorporated with the responses to Question 32. 
In an attempt to code the responses as objectively as possible, the responses to the 
two questions were read three times during the coding process. The first reading, or 
“pass,” employed an “open coding” technique with the goal of identifying broad themes 
and patterns.27  After these were established, the responses were read again, this time 
                                                 
27 W. Lawrence Neuman, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, 7th 
edition (Boston, MA:  Allyn and Bacon, 2011), 511. 
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employing an “axial coding” technique, which focused more on the preliminary 
categories than on the data itself. Axial coding identifies trends within the trends and 
possible correlations and subdivisions.28 This step is crucial for discerning distinctions 
between the responses, and it allows researchers in the final reading to identify clear 
trends. The final reading consisted of “selective coding,” which sought to bring the 
responses and trends together.29  When this step was completed, the data were organized 
into nine categories: Administrative Requirements, Career, Community, Education, 
Gender, Mentor, Structure, Training, and Other. 
A. RESPONSE CATEGORIES 
1. Administrative Requirements  
Administrative Requirements refers to obligations generated by programs such as 
the Readiness Cost Reporting Program (RCRP), or other duplicate reporting generated by 
the Group or Mobile Unite level. Comments concerning administrative requirements 
were divided into general administrative requirements comments and comments focused 
on EOD Warfare qualification, which outlines the administrative and operational 
requirements that a junior officer must obtain prior to being a fully warfare designated 
officer. Over the last few years, EOD leadership focused on and reviewed the process in 
attempt to make revisions, but with change often comes criticism. An example of a 
comment concerning general administrative requirements is, “The administrative 
reporting systems do not reflect the operational needs of the community.” An example of 
a comment concerning EOD Warfare qualification is, “It is becoming more and more 
common for a JO to earn an Officer Badge prior to ever having completed an EOD 
deployment. This has inherent concerns.” Many of the comments that focused on the 
EOD Warfare qualification expressed similar feelings—a general displeasure with the 
current qualification.    
 
 
                                                 
28 Neuman, Social Research Methods, 512.  
29 Neuman, Social Research Methods, 514. 
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2. Career 
Career comments focused on an individual’s progress through the community, the 
promotion process, retention, separation, or any other force-shaping tool (e.g., financial 
incentives and desirable assignments). Career comments were divided into general career 
comments, family, FITREP process, career progression, and retention. The general career 
comments focused on career-oriented ideas, but they did not occur frequently enough to 
create a subcategory. The statement, “The mandated career path is stifling and takes away 
from my naval experience,” is illustrative of such a comment. Almost a quarter of the 
career comments focused on the hardships of being married and away from home, or the 
effects of moving every two years. Comments on the FITREP process focused on the 
Navy’s evaluation process, which plays a crucial role in career progression. The FITREP 
comments gave attention to evaluations based off merit (not by time at command), or 
revisions to the current FITREP process. Several other comments specifically addressed 
career progression and thus were grouped into a separate category. These focused on how 
individuals advance through career choices. Career Progression comments focused on the 
current career path offered for an EOD Officer. Finally, a number of comments 
concerned retention and thus were grouped together. Such comments identified causes for 
separating from, or motives for staying in, the Navy.  
3. Community  
Community comments were sorted into four categories: general community, 
detailing, Limited Duty Officer (LDO), and leadership.30  The majority of the comments 
in this category (53%) were directed at the leadership. The leadership comments focused 
on a lack of community vision and endstate and, in some instances, directly called out 
leadership positions for failing their subordinates. General comments made up the second 
largest category. Examples of a general comment about the community are, “Bring more 
EOD officers into the strategic/operational conversation” or “the EOD community does a 
                                                 
30 A Limited Duty Officer (LDO) is an officer who commissioned after serving at least eight years as 
an enlisted sailor. The purpose of an LDO is to provide technical background skills to the officer corps that 
would not usually be developed through a more traditional commission source such as a service academy 
or a Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). See 
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupersnpc/officer/communitymanagers/ldo_cwo/Pages/default.aspx. 
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poor job recognizing talent.” Comments regarding detailing focused on the detailing 
process within the community. Community detailers are responsible for balancing the 
needs of the Navy with individual career goals. They are responsible for writing orders 
for individuals within the community to “ensure personnel distribution,” or in other 
words, to match the individual with the needs of the Navy.31  In the private sector, this 
would be the equivalent of talent management or human resourcing. The LDO 
subcategory makes up a small percentage of the community comments. In fact, they 
make up less than 1% of the total comments. However, the small number of comments is 
because of the 229 respondents, only fifteen were LDOs. Thus, in spite of this small 
number, they were grouped into a separate category in order to capture the opinions of 
this highly experienced minority. The LDO comments focused on both removing the 
restrictions from the billets they can fill and adding some diversity to the LDOs’ career 
pipeline.  
4. Education 
Comments concerning education were grouped into a single category. These 
captured respondents’ desire to pursue graduate or postgraduate level education 
opportunities.  
5. Gender 
There were only a handful of comments regarding gender. This may, however, 
reflect the fact that only 3% of EOD officers are female and that females were more 
likely to express a grievance than males.32 Whether this, indeed, is what occurred is 
difficult to know since it is impossible to tie specific comments to respondents’ 
demographic information. However, most of the comments tended to express vague 
sentiments, such as “treat genders equal”; thus, it seems likely that women EOD officers 
were more likely to express a grievance concerning gender. 
                                                 
31 “Officer Community Management and Detailing,” Navy Personnel Command, accessed on October 
13, 2016, http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/officer/Pages/default2.aspx. 
32 CDR Sara Olsen, email message to author, August 9, 2016. 
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6. Mentor  
Mentor comments focused on the Navy’s formal mentorship program and 
unofficial mentor relationships, and they were grouped together. The formal mentorship 
program was established in 2013. Its primary objective was to “provide guidance, with a 
focus on instituting a formal approach to developing leaders, retaining talent and 
enhancing career development, without creating an additional administrative burden.”33 
Unfortunately, many of the comments suggested general dissatisfaction with the program 
or how it has been implemented. Leadership revised the Mentorship program late in 
2015, yet it is unclear whether the comments generated target the recent revisions or the 
original instruction.   
7. Structure 
The structure category consists of comments toward the current chain of 
command or force layout to include Mobile Unit mission break down, deployments, and 
manning. Some of these comments focused on empowering the Junior Officers more, 
while others called for a strong focus on a single mission such as Mine Counter Measures 
or supporting Special Operation Forces.   
8. Training 
Comments concerning training focused on operational training requirements and 
were divided into four categories: general training, career course, junior officer training, 
and the training manual.34 The general training comments reflect a wide spectrum of 
observations and critiques, some of which focused on the early phases of training (e.g., 
dive school and EOD school), while others focused on the Fleet Readiness Training Plan 
(FRTP).35 Career course is an all-encompassing term for professional training aimed at 
                                                 
33 Department of the Navy, COMNECC/COMNECCPAC INSTRUCTION 5300.1A Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal Warfare Officer’s Mentoring Program, 2015. 
34 The Training Manual’s (COMEODGRUTWO/ONE M-3502 series (EOD TRAMAN)) purpose is to 
outline “policy, procedures and responsibilities for all aspects of training” for EOD leadership. It serves as 
a guide to conduct thorough training to ensure a high level of operational readiness.  
35 According to Section 2 in the EOD TRAMAN, the FRTP is a 24 to 32 month long training cycle 
designed to guide EOD training.    
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various paygrades and designed to shape and professionalize the force with vital 
knowledge at key career milestones. Almost a third of the training comments focused on 
Junior Officer Training. In the last decade, community leadership increased effort to 
provide appropriate training to the junior officers. Much of this training has been well 
received, but, according to the survey comments, there are some individuals who still feel 
it is lacking. Concerns regarding the training manual received the fewest number of 
comments, but due to its key role during the FRTP process, it befits the EOD community 
to consider these comments.   
9. Other 
The final category includes those comments that cannot be sorted into any of the 
other categories, and they concern a wide range of topics from equipment to personal 
experiences. Due to the lack of consistency in this category, it has little quantitative 
value. However, a close study of these comments may provide qualitative insight to 
community leadership. 
B. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Many of the responses reflected more than one category. For example, a response 
such as, “I have gone back and forth on whether or not I want to separate from the 
community. While the Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) is tempting, it does not 
help me reach my end goal of making time for graduate level education,” could be sorted 
into multiple categories. Initially, the respondent mentions both separating and the CSRB 
(a force shaping tool), and thus could be coded under Career. However, later the 
respondent notes that he or she would like to attend graduate school, so it could be coded 
as an Education comment. How were comments like this resolved? They were coded into 
multiple categories—in this case, Career and Education. 
C. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The data were coded in two ways. Initially, just the responses from Question 32 
were recorded and analyzed. The results from this analysis are presented in Table 1. 
Next, responses from Question 34 that addressed change in the EOD were coded and then 
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combined with the original data from Question 32. These results are presented in Table 2. 
In most cases, the distribution of responses (i.e., their percentage) varied little. Career 
comments displayed the largest increase (+3.2%), while structure comments decreased 
the most (-3.7%). 
Table 1.   Question 32 Response Patterns 














Table 1 shows the distribution of responses to Question 32. There was not a 
majority in any of the categories, but a few categories do stand out among the others. The 
most common category was Career, containing career centric comments (23.5%), while 
comments regarding Structure (16.0%), Training (14.5%), Administrative Requirements 
(14.0%), and Community (14.0%) were not too far behind. The statistical difference in 
responses between the latter four categories is minimal, so each category in this grouping 
should be considered equally important. Finally, comments regarding education (3.6%), 
mentorship (2.2%), and gender (0.9%) were rare, but still provide insight to the 
leadership. The category, “Recategorize,” reflects two comments (out of 220) that did not 
apply to the question in any sense. Therefore, these responses were not sorted into the 
“Other” category because although they did address the topic, they did not recur enough 
to be identified as a separate category.   
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Table 2 presents the distribution of responses to Questions 32 and 34 combined. 
For the most part, the distribution of responses is similar to that presented in Table 1. 
Career-centric comments are the most common (26.8%) with comments regarding 
Community (15.4%), Administrative Requirements (15.1%), Training (13.2%), and 
Structure (12.3%) following, albeit in a slightly different ranked order. As before, 
comments regarding Education (3.9%), Mentorship (3.0%), and Gender (0.6%) were 
relatively rare. 
Table 2.   Q32 and Q34 Combined Response Patterns 














All of the categories in Table 2 indicate grievances that could result in officer 
separation. While none of the categories took an overwhelming majority, the Career-
oriented comments do stand out to be the most prevalent. The paragraphs below provide 
a snapshot of the three categories that received attention during the interview process—
Career, Community, and Administrative Requirements.  
1. Career 
As noted earlier, Career comments focused on an individual’s progress through 
the community. In particular, they focused on the promotion process, retention, 
separation, or any force shaping tool (whether that be financial incentives or desirable 
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assignments). Table 3 breaks the Career comments into a series of subcategories. The 
purpose of the Career category is to capture the intent of DOPMA regulations. The 
comments that were coded Career suggested and/or critiqued a policy change that is 
beyond the scope of the EOD community’s leadership. As addressed earlier, DOPMA 
policy change requires legislative action. While the survey results indicate there is a need 
for change with DOPMA regulation, they do not concur with Kane’s analysis of the 
severity of the issue. 







Career-General 48.1% 37.5% 
Career-Family 23.1% 26.1% 
Career-Retention 13.5% 22.7% 
Career-FITREP 7.7% 6.8% 
Career-LDO 0.0% 2.3% 
Career-Progression 7.7% 4.5% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
 
The breakdown for career responses that involved family is 26.0% (7.0% of the 
aggregate). As mentioned previously, these were responses that directly correlated to a 
sense of career and family balance. An illustrative example of this would be, “I enjoy my 
job, but moving every two to three years has a negative impact on my wife’s career.” The 
percentage identifying family as a grievance is substantially less than Kane’s combined 
score of 81%. There could be a demographic explanation for this difference, but the 
underlying demographics of Kane’s results are unavailable, so it is impossible to know. 
However, 72% of the individuals surveyed by NPRST are married.   
Career-Retention comments made up almost a quarter of the career responses. 
Although this subcategory lacks the density that is seen in Career-Family, almost all of 
Career-Family’s comments share similar sentiments (e.g., “the constant moving is 
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adversely affecting my family”). Career-Retention comments do not have a pattern of 
grievance other than that the comments are directly tied to possible separation. For 
example, one individual made a correlation between his or her willingness to stay in the 
community and the community’s inability to challenge him; whereas, another individual 
made a similar correlation between separation and workplace politics.   While the data 
provides qualitative value, the lack of consistency gives it little quantitative value. The 
other three subcategories, Career-FITREP, Career-LDO, and Career-Progression, which 
generated the least amount of comments, make up less than 15% of the category.  
2. Community 
Community comments focused on issues across the entire EOD Officer Corps. 
The comments were subcategorized into general, leadership, LDO, and detailing. 
Community-Leadership generated the most responses in Q32, but when combined with 
the data from Q34 it fell to a close second behind Community-General responses. Two 
major patterns emerged from Community-Leadership: a general displeasure with EOD 
Officer Leadership and the higher leadership’s failure to communicate strategy and vision 
to the lower levels. Fortunately, both are within the leadership’s ability to remedy. As 
mentioned previously, the Community-LDO comments focused on more job 
opportunities within the EOD sphere of influence. Lastly, Community-Detailing 
potentially could have been grouped with the Community-General comments, but many 
of the Community-Detailing responses were blatant and expressed displeasure with the 
process. These comments called for greater transparency when selecting for future duty 
stations and follow-on orders. The breakdown of Community responses is depicted in 


















Unlike the other two previous categories, the homogeneity of this category only 
requires one sub-category, Administrative Requirements-EOD Warfare Qualification. 
Even then, the general pattern of the sub-category closely aligns with the theme of the 
category. Whereas the category has a strong focus to alleviate unnecessary administrative 
requirements, the sub-category takes the same grievance and directs it toward the EOD 
Officer Warfare Qualification. Table 5 indicates the breakdown of Administrative 
Requirement responses. 







Administrative Requirements-General 54.8% 46.0% 
Administrative Requirements-EOD 




The comments generated from the NPRST’s survey provide critical insight into 
the grievances with active duty EOD officers. This chapter identified patterns within the 
survey that enable community decision makers to prioritize the grievances and implement 
policies. While this chapter provides a quantitative metric, this does not necessarily mean 
the category with the highest percentage is indicative of the most important of all the 
categories listed. In this instance, the Career category generated the most responses. 
Unfortunately, many of the revisions needed to implement career changes are beyond the 
scope of EOD leadership. Instead, leadership may choose to direct its attention to those 
major grievances that are within its influence, such as improving methods to 
communicate the community’s mission and end state, or alleviate unnecessary 
administrative burdens. The results explored in the final section of this chapter parallel 
the categories identified in the interview process of this thesis as well. That interview 
process will be explored in the following chapter.    
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III. INTERVIEWS WITH FORMER ACTIVE DUTY 
EOD OFFICERS 
The interviews for this thesis were conducted in accordance with Naval 
Postgraduate School Institutional Review Board (IRB) standards. All subjects were 
volunteers who learned of the research through third parties. Furthermore, they had all 
formerly served in the EOD Officer corps within the last ten years. Most were accepted 
into the research; however, a few were turned away in an effort to cover a wider spectrum 
of year groups and a male/female proportion that more accurately reflects the 
community’s demographics. Prior to each interview, the candidate signed a written 
consent form that detailed the purpose and methodology of the research. During the 
interview process, a deliberate effort was made not to lead the subjects. If a subject 
provided a vague or inconclusive response to a question, he or she was asked to elaborate 
until the topic was fully explored. At no time during an interview were answers from 
other subjects shared. These precautions were crucial to maintaining the research’s 
integrity. 
In total, nine subjects were selected to be interviewed. Seven were interviewed 
over the phone, one was interviewed in person,36 and one was not interviewed because, 
during the research window, the subject was unavailable. Regardless, the eight subjects 
provided sufficient information to identify possible factors that could lead officers to 
separate from the EOD community. Seven were male and one was female. Six were 
married, one was single, and two were divorced.37 The majority of the interviewees 
currently work in small businesses, playing key roles in management and logistics. Many 
of the descriptions of their current jobs reflect responsibilities similar to the Operations or 
Executive officer at a Mobile Unit. Time in service varied from subject to subject, but the 
average was 7.8 years, which is somewhat lower than the anticipated eight- to ten-year 
mark for separation from the community. Two of the subjects left the community as 
                                                 
36 This format proved to be the most advantageous, because of the social atmosphere between the 
subject and myself. 
37 One of the subjects remarried.   
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Lieutenant Commanders (O-4), while the other six left as Lieutenants (O-3). This data 
point may explain why the average time served was lower than anticipated, since, 
typically, an EOD officer will not be promoted to Lieutenant Commander until the ten-
year mark.  
A. SEPARATION FACTORS   
This section explores the grievances and factors that led to the subjects’ 
separation from the community. They are sorted into themes that emerged from the 
interview process. Many of the responses explored below were answers to the question, 
“Do you remember the leading factors that led to this decision [to separate]?” Others 
were answers to the question, “What do you miss the least about being a part of the EOD 
community?” The factors are not presented in any specific order. 
There was no significant pattern correlating to command type at time of 
separation: three of the subjects were at staffs, three of the subjects were at tactically 
operational units, and two were at shore-based detachments. However, there was a 
correlation as to when the decision was made to separate. Many of the subjects’ remarks 
indicate an interest in leaving when their operational time came to an end. For instance, 
Subject 4 decided to leave during his last deployment when he realized he would be 
“behind a desk” for the rest of his career. Subjects 2, 5, and 6 expressed similar 
sentiments, although Subject 5 admitted that when he commissioned he was unsure how 
long he would stay in the Navy.  “I never thought I was going to do twenty, but I was 
open to it if things lined up. It was the right time to separate. As I shifted from 
operational to administrative [roles], I realized I could spend desk time anywhere. In 
short, I took my career day by day.”  Similarly, Subject 7 remarked that he was never 
“dead set” on making a twenty-year career out of the Navy. Attrition such as this is 
important to recognize. There will always be individuals whom the service will be unable 
to retain, regardless of policy changes. Fortunately, a certain level of attrition is natural 
and can be predicted by personnel managers. 
When the participants were asked what they missed or liked most about the EOD 
community, the response was unanimous: the people or the camaraderie. All expressed 
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gratitude for the opportunity to work with such high-caliber individuals and experience 
the camaraderie that the community breeds. Some displayed a high level of brevity when 
asked what they missed the most, such as the Subject 1, who just responded with 
“camaraderie.”  Others were almost consumed by the nostalgia. Subject 3 responded, 
“The camaraderie experienced within the EOD Community and the bond shared among 
the brotherhood/sisterhood is something that few experience outside of the community.” 
Subject 5 responded, “Camaraderie. I miss being a part of something special. Everyone 
in the community is a performer and that creates a sense of pride. Additionally, it was 
such a variety of people coming together for the same cause” and Subject 7 responded, 
“The trust I experienced with the people around me was unprecedented. We trusted each 
other with our lives. That doesn’t exist in the civilian world. Everyone is out for 
themselves.” A similar pattern is also seen in the survey data. When the participants were 
asked what they like most about the community, 60% responded with the people or the 
camaraderie, and an additional 6% answered with culture. An argument could be made 
that these two themes are too closely related to distinguish between them. However, these 
responses present a challenge to research that has found that individuals who are more 
deeply embedded in an organization are less likely to leave than those serving on its 
periphery.38  Within the EOD community, it appears that even those who are deeply 
embedded are leaving.39  
Nevertheless, the community should take tremendous pride in the fact that both 
those who are currently serving and those who have served value their colleagues and the 
bonds shared, yet the community’s strong ties should embolden the senior leadership to 
also address retention problems in the officer corps. The expressed unanimity regarding 
the personnel and camaraderie testifies to the effectiveness of the enlisted and officer 
recruiting programs. However, attracting the best and brightest will only benefit the 
                                                 
38 Pamela A. Popielarz and J. Miller McPherson. 1995. “On the Edge or in Between: Niche Position, Niche 
Overlap, and the Duration of Voluntary Association Memberships.” American Journal of Sociology 101(3):698-720; 
Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge. 1980. “Networks of Faith: Interpersonal Bonds and Recruitment to 
Cults and Sects.” American Journal of Sociology 85(6):1376-95. 
39 Such a conclusion, of course, assumes that “camaraderie” is a good measure of embeddedness in the 
EOD community. A better test of the theory would be to compare the level of embeddedness of those who 
left and those who stayed, while controlling for a host of other potential factors. 
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community if it can retain them long enough to profit from the very attributes that made 
them desirable recruits in the first place. 
B. FAMILY STABILITY 
Six of the eight subjects felt their family life played a dominant role in the reason 
for their departure. While many expressed different versions of the grievance, they all 
identified that absence from their family and/or constant moving was unacceptable with 
where they, as individuals, wanted to be in their lives. For example, one of Subject 1’s 
immediate family members was diagnosed with a terminal illness. However, the subject’s 
leadership was unwilling to accommodate this special circumstance, so the subject 
ultimately left the service. This is consistent with the findings from the NPC study 
reflecting the importance of a family life and a military career balance. One NPC 
participant made the following comment on family stability:   
The amount of time spent away from family during the FRTP, ULT cycles 
and deployments. I have been in the EOD Community for almost twelve 
years, and out of this time I have performed eight FRPT cycles and been 
deployed eight times supporting three different Mobile Units. I have only 
been around for maybe two years of my six-year marriage and maybe a 
year of child’s life total. It is taking a toll on my mental, physical, and 
professional wellbeing.   
Similarly, subjects 2, 3, 5, and 6 from the interviews showed concern for the health of 
their marriage as a consequence of their being gone and/or moving. “one factor was 
family. With the unpredictability in determining where my next orders would take me, I 
was at a point in my relationship with my now wife, where I believed that the relationship 
would have suffered detrimentally if I had not resigned and continued to serve.”  Subject 
5 expressed a similar grievance.  “I felt like the people I was disconnected from were the 
people that meant the most to me. The thought of being away from the kids I wanted to 
have with my wife was huge.”  In short, both the NPC survey and the interviews 
conducted for this thesis suggest that family concerns stand out as a primary grievance. 
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C. LEADERSHIP 
In one capacity or another, many of the subjects also expressed displeasure with 
their leadership at the time they were in the service. Many of these responses mirrored a 
trend within the NPC survey: a feeling that the community lacks vision or fails to 
communicate vision to the junior levels. Subjects 1, 2, 4, and 6 all expressed similar 
sentiments, but subject 6 articulated it the best: 
The leadership failed to give clear direction for the way ahead, but it was 
very clear that my job was changing. There was just so much uncertainty 
with the wars winding down. It was my experience at other commands 
when the vision becomes less clear, the morale begins to fail. I didn’t want 
to go through that again. I kept hearing it over and over again that the 
community was refocusing on MCM, but I was an MCM commander, and 
I never saw that with funding or training opportunities. I didn’t know what 
I should be doing to further my career. 
Compare these remarks to those of a NPC survey participant: 
Improve strategic alignment/community vision for our officers to 
accomplish/work toward in key staff positions at COCOMs, TSOCs and 
Task Force. What are the key things we (EOD leadership) want for our 
community out of these positions? We have ability to influence and 
represent Navy EOD, but what is our endstate?  If it is just PRODEV in 
order to develop and be EOD CO’s these are great opportunities, but I 
think we can do more with guidance and a common strategic 
understanding of where we want to influence so we are all on message. 
We all have potential to act as de facto EOD LNOs, not just be staff 
officers. 
Furthermore, many of the subjects felt as if leadership did not have the junior 
officers’ best interests at heart when making decisions. Subject 4 reflected on his time as 
a platoon commander. During a post-deployment brief with his CO, the CO expressed 
more interest in the PowerPoint’s format than the returning platoon. This led Subject 4 to 
feel as if he and his guys were “under appreciated” by the leadership. Subject 2 and 
Subject 4 both agreed that the leadership at the Group level and higher did not appear to 
be moving the community in a healthy direction. Subject 5 called attention to the fact that 
the excessive administrative burdens were more important to the leadership than training, 
even though the latter carried the potential to prevent injury or death. Both Subjects 2 and 
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4 felt that the leadership could have made a greater effort to alleviate the junior 
leadership from administrative burdens.    
As noted earlier, grievances directed at leadership were present, but not as 
prominent in the NPC survey. In fact, only 7% of the comments from the NPC survey 
focused on community leadership, whereas a majority of the former active duty officers 
addressed this concern. The difference in data may indicate a pattern leading to 
separation. As time goes on, an individual’s disillusionment grows until separation seems 
a more reasonable solution. This suggests that there may be a disconnect between the 
junior officers and the senior officers of the community. In that regard, it is possible the 
community could greatly benefit from both sides of the table coming together to better 
understand the other’s perspective. 
D. MILITARY BUREAUCRACY 
More than half of the interviewed subjects stated that the military bureaucracy 
was a factor that led to their separation from the community. This is potentially 
significant because not one active duty member who participated in the NPC survey 
complained about military bureaucracy. Instead, they complained about administrative 
requirements. A clearer understanding of the distinction between military bureaucracy 
and administrative requirements may provide insight in how to retain a small percentage 
of the personnel separating. In the interview process, Subject 7 associated military 
bureaucracy with the time it took to implement change. He also noted that, “The 
atmosphere made it difficult to be creative and innovative. Creativity and innovativeness 
happens [sic] quick. The military bureaucracy cannot keep up with it.”  Subject 8 agreed. 
The military bureaucracy limits an innovative atmosphere that allows 
change to be implemented. The career path is a good example of this, it’s 
an antiquated system. If someone wants to stay at a lower rank, why not? 
Maybe they can be a greater use to the community. Individuals should be 
allowed to choose their own career after deciding to come into the Navy.  
Subject 2’s perspective of military bureaucracy differed greatly. He provided an 
example of an officer who served eighteen years in the service with distinction, but was 
fired because a junior enlisted got drunk and did something “stupid.” Furthermore, 
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Subject 2 did not believe it was realistic for the community to meet all of the 
requirements that are expected of it by the Navy, despite strong efforts. Subject 2 was the 
most outspoken of the subjects about the military bureaucracy. 
To gain better insight into their frustration with military bureaucracy, the subjects 
were asked a follow-up question: How did they define military bureaucracy? They were 
encouraged to use examples, with the intention, for purposes of this research, of being 
able to assemble an all-encompassing definition from their combined input. Some of the 
subjects failed to come up with a detailed response. Military bureaucracy to them was an 
intangible that existed in the work place. However, a few provided responses that were 
helpful. Subject 2’s definition of military bureaucracy is the vaguest, but its elements are 
consistent with all of the other responses: 
Bureaucracy to me, means many different echelons of leadership having 
oversight and decision making authority over the actions of an 
organization, unit, platoon, and/or squad. This could be where a squad 
requests permission to perform a  mission or a task, and it must travel up 
several rungs in order to get approval to execute. On the flipside, this 
could be a decision that is mandated from the top rung, and gets modified 
or made more complex as it travels down the rungs of leadership to squad 
level. 
Put simply, Subject 2 identified military bureaucracy as oversight that impedes progress, 
and it does not necessarily have to come from the highest levels of leadership. Subject 2 
believed that every leadership level has an opportunity to impose its influence.  
Subject 5’s definition was similar to that of Subject 2: 
Military Bureaucracy is self-inflicted roadblocks that hinder productivity 
and efficiency that results from having a well-defined chain of command 
where each level of the chain does not feel empowered to act. As a result, 
every decision and action is made at a high level by people who are too 
far removed from the process to make an accurate decision.  
Subject 4’s definition was broader and encompassed a wide spectrum of grievances 
ranging from a zero defect mentality to an overly centralized form of leadership.   
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people start making decisions based on what is going to keep them out of 
trouble…not what is best for the unit, team, or their supported unit. 
People who embrace this as the way of the future really buy in and only 
add more bureaucratic processes through online systems, reporting 
requirements, etc.   
Subject 4 referenced the EOD community’s supply chain as an example. From his 
perspective, several of the items that were issued at the time were worthless. They failed 
to meet the needs of the force, but the community was restricted in its ability to quickly 
alleviate the disconnect, so instead each platoon was permitted to purchase the items it 
needed on a government credit card. Subject 5 described this as a “waste of time and 
money.”  Subject 6’s definition mirrors Subject 5’s: 
I would define military bureaucracy as any administrative burden that 
doesn’t reflect reality or is disproportionately burdensome. For example, 
a big requirement of any officer is the oversight of training and readiness. 
I always had to create binders that had to document training and 
adherence to certain readiness expectations and usually the amount of 
time and resources spent preparing and maintaining those documents 
exceeded the time spent doing actual training. 
Two common elements among all of the definitions are a focus on excessive 
administrative requirements that disrupt productivity and a highly centralized chain of 
command. As noted in the previous chapter, the survey identified a similar pattern with 
active duty personnel. One survey participant commented the following. “We are bogged 
down with paper work and programs that are not helping us train or complete any 
mission... Multiple programs reporting the same thing that aren’t correct anyways need 
to be streamlined.”  Another survey participant expressed a similar grievance. 
“Administrative burden. NKO, FLTMPS, ESAMS, DJRS, RCRP, DRRS-N, ASM, BOL, 
DTS, EOD portal, etc., are enough to drive anyone crazy. It is ridiculous to expect a 
Platoon Commander or OIC to stay on top of all these programs and still juggle their 
[sic] operational requirements.”40  The common pattern between the quantitative and 
                                                 
40 “NKO, FLTMPS, ESAMS, DJRS, RCRP, DRRS-N, ASM, BOL, DTS, EOD portal, etc.” The 
acronyms listed are all different reporting programs that an OIC must be familiar with in order to ensure his 
unit’s readiness. 
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qualitative data emphasizes the need to mitigate the administrative burden the community 
puts on its personnel. 
E. OPERATIONAL TO ADMINISTRATIVE TRANSITION 
Several of the subjects left the service when their billets shifted (or were about to 
shift) from operational to administrative, and many identified this as a factor for their 
separation. Subject 2 described his future in the community as “not rewarding.”  Subject 
4 articulated the importance of a fulfilling career in his final comments, “If you want to 
hold on to the strong, smart, dynamic guys, you have to give them careers that are like 
them. You have to craft a career that attracts them.”  Subject 7 was appreciative of his 
time in the EOD Officer corps, but felt that he “couldn’t reach [his] full potential.” 
Admittedly, this factor was not as prominent in the NPC survey, but some of the 
respondents made similar remarks. For example, one commented: “The whole idea of 
being operational for a short blip in a 20-year career, then being required to hit the OPS, 
XO, CO, etc., wickets in succession with aspirations only to get back to a Mobile Unit 
doesn’t inspire me. Personally, the biggest change that would both move the community 
forward, add career options, and inspire me to stay would be bringing the 1140X program 
online.” Taken together, these comments suggest that a future policy shift that enables 
talented officers to remain in operational billets for an additional tour may lead to higher 
retention. This will be explored in the concluding chapter, which focuses on possible 
policies to mitigate officer separation.  
F. CONCLUSION 
The volunteers who participated in the interview process provided unique 
qualitative data to this research. Their time in the EOD Officer Corps followed by a 
decision to separate can potentially provide key insight into grievances that lead to officer 
separation. Furthermore, the volunteers’ input provides perspective to NPRST’s study, 
which only surveyed active duty members. Without the interviews, the survey is an 
incomplete dataset that only provides half of the picture.   
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This chapter explored the interview process, but also identified four major 
patterns in the interviewees’ responses. The interviews indicated that family stability, 
leadership, military bureaucracy, and an officer’s operational time all played factors in 
the participants’ respective decisions to separate. The interviews confirm the survey’s 
results. This complementary data may enable and empower EOD Officer Leadership to 
take action with confidence. 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS   
This final chapter focuses on possible policy shifts indicated by the research 
conducted during this study. Two caveats are in order, however: the author makes no 
pretense of understanding all facets of the community management process, and, 
moreover, the author recognizes that the suggested policies require more research in 
addition to what has been provided here.   
A. LONGER TOURS, FOUR-YEAR ORDERS 
As addressed above, family stability was a prominent grievance in the survey and 
also proved to be an influencing factor that led many of the interview subjects to leave 
the community. Community leadership could present the argument that in recent years 
efforts to limit unnecessary moves have been taken by consolidating commands into two 
main geographical hubs—San Diego, CA, and Virginia Beach, VA. Prior to this, 
commands were spread up and down each coast. Community leadership may also present 
the argument that moving is a part of being in the military, and while it may not always 
suit Navy service members, they are paid to meet the needs of the Navy. Both of these 
arguments are be valid, but the research may suggest they are also outdated and need to 
be reexamined.  
One possible solution to mitigating personnel moves is to increase the time spent 
at a single command. Currently, EOD officer orders are usually written for a two-year 
period, which means an unlucky individual may never be afforded the opportunity to 
settle down in an area before he begins to plan his next move. If the tour length was 
doubled, such a change, in theory could decrease the number of necessary moves during 
an officer’s time serving in the community. However, there are some known second-
order effects that the community leadership would have to be willing to accept. 
According to the EOD Officer Community Manager, personnel accessions are 
based off filling first tour operational billets and having a large enough inventory to meet 
Lieutenant Commander (O-4) requirements. For the purpose of calculating accession 
numbers, the general rule is based on the former rather than the latter. Currently, there are 
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sixty-three first tour operational billets. Each year half of these billets are required to be 
filled while the other half complete their tour. In order for the community to be properly 
manned at the junior officer level, it must bring in half of the required billets plus a 
contingent to account for attrition. In this instance, the community brings in an additional 
three personnel to account for attrition during training. As a result, the community is 
required to take thirty-five officer personnel in order to maintain required manning levels.   
If the tour length were doubled, it would greatly impact the accession numbers. 
The number of operational billets would remain the same (sixty-three), but instead of half 
of these billets opening each year, only a quarter would become available because 
personnel would be rotating out every four years instead of two. Again, the community 
would need to account for attrition in the training pipeline and would bring an additional 
three personnel. Therefore, the community would only need to assess nineteen personnel 
each year. The lower number of accessions would require all of the community’s 
personnel requirements to be overhauled. Without a complete restructuring of the 
community, there would be even worse manning problems at the Lieutenant and 
Lieutenant Commander paygrades than currently exist. In short, the very issue that this 
course of action sought to alleviate, retention of senior Lieutenants and Lieutenant 
Commanders, would instead be exacerbated. 
The community’s ability to address the grievance with regard to frequent 
permanent change of station moves is limited. Both Tim Kane’s data, and the data 
collected for this research, clearly indicate that such changes are a common concern 
among service members. Unfortunately, for the EOD Officer Corps, the required changes 
are above the community’s leadership influence and are closely tied to DOPMA, which 
may be the reason why Kane calls for a complete overhaul of the military personnel 
system. 
B. INCREASE OPERATIONAL TIME 
Officers in both the survey and interviews expressed similar frustrations with the 
short operational time for an EOD officer. In that regard, extending operational time may 
be a strategy worth considering in order to retain junior officers. This does not mean that 
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every EOD officer’s operational time will be extended. The policy this paper proposes is 
intended for those officers who have demonstrated exemplary leadership in addition to 
tactical and administrative expertise. The policy proposed is designed to serve as a force 
multiplier and a retention tool. The billets described below would be reserved for well-
rounded, mature officers who possess an understanding of the administration and logistic 
skillsets needed to run an operation team, but who also seek an additional tour as an 
operational leader.   
The proposed policy is as follows. After being selected in the community, the 
officer would attend initial training. Upon completion, the officer then would complete 
his or her first two tours just as he or she would in the current career pipeline. During the 
first two tours, the officer in question would be expected to complete all career 
milestones. Currently, those career milestones include the EOD Officer PQS and the 
EOD Officer Department Head (DH) PQS. Also, in keeping with the current career 
progression, the individual would do a shore tour at this time. This would include being 
an OIC at a shore-based detachment, attending the Naval Postgraduate School, or serving 
on a staff. However, by the proposed career progression, an officer would have already 
distinguished him or herself as a candidate for extended operational time. This would be 
reflected on his or her FITREPs and in conversation between the Mobile Unit leadership 
and the Officer Community Detailer. If the individual accepted the extended operational 
time, he or she would be required to go to a staff, preferably outside of the community. 
The purpose of sending the officer to a staff outside the community is to broaden his or 
her horizons and experiences within the military. Staff work for a junior officer has the 
potential to mature and provide perspective, which is what the community needs from a 
junior officer who is going to be regularly interacting with other inexperienced junior 
officers when he or she returns to the Mobile Unit as a Company Commander.  
Currently, the Company Commander billet is not utilized properly. In many 
instances, an EOD Company Commander has only one more tour than that of his or her 
subordinate Platoon Commanders, which means that it is possible for the Company 
Commander to have been at the Mobile Unit only one more year than his or her Platoon 
Commanders—which reflects a blatant deficiency in knowledge and experience. The 
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proposed policy fills the Company Commander billets with well-rounded EOD officers 
who have at least eight years of experience in the Navy.  
One argument that may be presented against this policy shift is that it may affect 
the promotion rates of the officers who were selected and accepted to extend operational 
time. Figures 1 and 2 are diagrams of the current career progression and the proposed 
career progression, respectively. 
Figure 1.  Current Career Progression 
 
Figure 2.  Proposed Career Progression 
 
As the figures illustrate, initially the two career progressions are identical until the 
third tour after training. The current career progression provides options for the officer to 
go to a shore tour, whereas the proposed career progression sends what would be a 
young, top performing Lieutenant to a staff. The main distinction between the two career 
progressions takes place at the six- to eight-year mark, where those who are selected for 
extended operational time return to the Mobile Unit for a Company Commander tour, as 
opposed to the original career progression that would send them to a staff or a 
Department Head billet. Under the new proposed career progression, the same type of 
billets is being hit, although in a different time line. Therefore, it is hard to believe that 
the proposed career progression would affect promotion rates. Additionally, in the last 
seven years, the percentage of those who promote, versus those who are in-zone eligible, 
is just below 90% for the EOD community, almost fifteen percentage points more than 




C. CONCLUSION  
The author makes no claims that this paper addresses all concerns of EOD Officer 
personnel retention. Additionally, the author acknowledges that the subject is much 
greater than anticipated, and the research into this topic encountered many loopholes, 
dead ends and convoluted instructions (Military Bureaucracy). In fact, one of the largest 
obstacles encountered in this research was limiting the problem set to a reasonable focus 
and not digressing. Lastly, the author does not claim the policies proposed herein lack 
shortfalls that will need to be addressed. Nonetheless, this paper does attempt to provide 
compelling data that concludes there are significant trends within the EOD community 
that result in officer separation. Unfortunately, some of these trends are potentially 
beyond the community leadership’s influence, while others are well within its sphere of 
influence, including extended operational time.   
Ultimately, regardless of rank, the data indicate the greatest attribute the 
community has is its people. The majority of the survey and interview data did not 
articulate a particular rank or group. The response was simple and unanimous—the 
people and the camaraderie. If these are the EOD community’s greatest attributes, 
perhaps they should be used to address a problem that has plagued the officer community 
for over a decade. The people in the EOD community thrive in an environment that 
encourages their innovative spirit, and it is this innovative spirit that  makes them 
exemplary performers at their profession—the ability to not be confined by standard 
operating procedures and to succeed at complex problems with complex parameters that 
are beyond normal influence. Perhaps that same spirit should be applied to resolve the 
current retention problem? 
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